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Preface by David Boys, PSI 
This paper spells out the challenges facing the water sectors of Russia and Ukraine. These challenges include 
the weaknesses of the systems themselves, and the need to acknowledge that improvements are needed for 
the sake of the public and the service. The challenges also include pressure from the multinational companies 
and international institutions to privatise and commercialise the service, so it becomes a profitable business.  
These pressures threaten jobs, security and working conditions, as private businesses from home and abroad 
try to drive down expenses and maximise profits.  
 
For the workers in the sector and their unions, this means a further double challenge: how to protect jobs, pay 
and conditions while at the same time protecting and promoting improvements to the water service. As  
examples from Russia, Ukraine and many other countries show, we can expect widespread support for the 
position that water should not be privatised or be a source of private profit.  But that support has to be 
mobilised by working around an agenda that can be shared with the public, not only with water workers. 
 
Trade unions need to develop a clear strategy. It needs to start from clear general objectives: 
 protection of union organisation, members' employment security, conditions 
 protection and development of water as public service delivered by municpalities 
 minimise the impact of IFIs and MNCs on the policy process of government. 
 
The strategy can be developed through a range of tactics, which may involve the unions in traditional types  
of action as well as completely new forms of activity, including: 
 the use of strike action, demonstration over employment protection or privatisation 
 use of national solidarity (via other unions, civil society, political processes) 
 use of international solidarity, using PSI‟s network and resources 
 publicising the problems experienced with privatisation elsewhere 
 
There needs to be political activity in order to develop a different position on the way to improve and defend 
the service. This may require a union to:  
 develop its own position on way forward: eg through public financing mechanisms and PUPs 
 consider use of national initiatives eg conferences with sympathetic academics, other organisations, 
 make systematic use of publicity, publicity 
 
It is important to plan ways of dealing with the international bodies: 
 develop a policy on what support is wanted from IFIs (development loans) and what is not wanted 
(conditionalities, finance for restructuring to create markets) 
 identify upcoming conferences and events and projects and make public critiques in advance:  
 - maybe demand platforms, maybe seek consultation via PSI  
 approach banks (EBRD, WB) to get them to require union agreements before anyone is financed (this 
happened in Bulgaria with an EBRD loan to finance a new power station) 
 
It is equally important to plan how to deal with multinationals: 
 insist that no company can operate without signing a union agreement first 
 demand representation on European Works Councils (EWCs) - use PSI and EPSU for support 
 make clear that the unions can hurt the companies by campaigning against their record: use PSI 
 
Have a strategy for dealing with the local companies (Russian oligarchs or Ukrainian opportunists): 
 get organised and recognised nationally if possible and wherever they go 
 but make sure this is not treated as an endorsement of privatisation 
 try and get rights to discuss any proposed jv with a MNC (and use of PSI support) 
 get agreements with the municipalities (and with government if possible) for protection of employment 
transfers (refer to EC legislation on Acquired Rights) and guarantees of re-employment if/when 
concessions collapse. 
 
David Boys 
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Executive summary and introduction 
 
This report contains three main sections. 
 
The first section examines the problems and policy issues in the water sector on Russia and Ukraine. It 
includes a discussion of the international context, showing that water privatisation is unusual, and has failed 
to deliver the expected expansion and improvement of services, but the international institutions such as the 
World Bank continue to promote the policy. The problems of the water sector in Russia and Ukraine are then 
discussed, and identified as being mainly to do with demand management, and with investment in repair, 
replacement and  maintenance of the existing networks.  The financing of this investment may come from 
user charges but also from taxation and cross-subsidy, as is normal elsewhere. The section also looks at a 
number of experiences with privatisation and reform so far in Ukraine and Russia, which demonstrate not 
only the real risks of privatisation, but also that improvements can be made and financed by municipal 
vodokanals without the intervention of a private operator, and that trade unions can benefit greatly from 
working with civil society groups. 
 
The second section looks at the activities of international institutions in trying to persuade Ukrainian, 
Russian and other governments in the region to adopt privatisation policies in this sector. The bodies doing 
this include the OECD, the EBRD, the EU, the World Bank, and the UNECE. 
 
The third section looks at the multinational water companies (MNCs) and their activities in Ukraine and 
Russia, and also at the Russian private companies which have started to capture municipal water operations. 
It notes the connections between the two groups. 
 
An annexe lists the projects under the EBRD and the World Bank which impact on water and sanitation in 
Russia, Ukraine and other former Soviet Union countries. 
 
1. Russia and Ukraine: water sector policy issues and case studies 
1.1. Global context 
The water sector in Russia and Ukraine is experiencing problems associated with physical deterioration of 
systems, devolution of responsibility to municipal level, the need to improve management capacity, and 
weak public finance mechanisms. However, these problems are not peculiar to the former Soviet Union: 
nearly all countries, including the EU and North America, face the need for costly repair and renewal, and 
municipalities everywhere find it difficult to deal with the financial and technical issues posed by water.  
 
In the great majority of cases these problems are addressed through municipal water operations, drawing on 
finance from user charges, taxation and borrowing. Over 90% of the world‟s water services are provided by 
the public sector – including 80% of EU countries, and 84% of the USA.  Despite considerable marketing 
efforts by the MNCs and the IFIs,  these proportions have changed little in the last decade. Only in France, 
England (not the rest of the UK), and the Czech republic is a majority of the system run by private 
companies.  
 
Globally, private water is dominated by two major French companies, Suez and Veolia, which between them 
hold about 70% of  private water contracts, worldwide; there are a few other European MNCs with much 
smaller market shares. Since 2002, the MNCs have been reducing their activities, because of failure to make 
adequate profits, experience of currency risk, economic collapse, uncertainty of demand, and widespread 
popular and political resistance.  
 
The World Bank and others have vigorously promoted water privatisation as a solution to the world‟s water 
problems since 1990. The Bank has now accepted that this policy has failed.  The World Bank itself 
published a strategic review in 2003 which admitted that private sector investment in infrastructure fell by 
more than 50% after 1997, and concluded that “the recent decreases in private sector interest in 
infrastructure show that reliance on the private sector alone will not be sufficient to guarantee a scaling-up 
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of infrastructure service provision”. The paper also reported that the World Bank‟s own investment had 
suffered: “World Bank infrastructure investment lending, especially in IBRD countries, declined by 50% 
between 1993 and 2002”, and noted that the reasons for this included the Bank‟s focus on private sector and 
its lack of attention to the actual needs of countries: “a lack of clarity on the roles of the private and public 
sector in infrastructure service provision and under-investment in country-level infrastructure diagnostic 
work”. 1  The World Bank‟s director for water and energy, Jamal Saghir, identified some of the key 
problems as the  declining interest of private sector and “decreasing faith in markets”. 2   
 
Not only has water privatisation failed to deliver investment, the effect of profit-seeking behaviour by private 
companies has led to price increases which have severely hit the poorest sections of society. By seeking to 
avoid all forms of risk, especially currency risk and demand risk, the companies have  contributed to 
economic problems - most obviously in the case of Argentina; in many cases they have cut staff levels 
severely, including attacks on trade union rights; and there have been convictions for corruption in France, 
Italy and the USA where public officials have been bribed by subsidiaries of the multinationals. 3  
 
 
1.2. Multinationals and international institutions in Russia and Ukraine 
Despite this global experience of failure, the international financial institutions (IFIs) and other bodies such 
as the OECD are making intense efforts to create conditions favouring a private market in water and 
sanitation in Russia, Ukraine and the whole NIS region.  Both the World Bank and the EBRD have included 
as conditions of some loans that the private sector be introduced. 
 
However, the multinational water companies have not developed much business so far in Russia and 
Ukraine. Apart from a failed attempt by Suez in Odessa in 2002, they have not tried to obtain concessions, as 
part of their policy of withdrawal from areas perceived as risky: they have only gained a few BOT contracts 
to build and run treatment plants. In Russia, a number of Russian-owned companies have been set up by the 
„oligarchs‟‟ groups, which have begun to create joint ventures with municipalities to provide water and other 
services. They are also seeking partnership with the multinationals, and in the medium term, the expansion of 
Russian companies may serve as a conduit for the MNCs.   
 
The activities of these companies and institutions are examined in detail in later sections of this paper.  
 
The issues facing the water sector in Russia need to be seen against this background of global experience. 
 
1.3. Water issues and problems 
 
According to the UNECE review in 20034 and World Bank overview 5, water systems in Russia, Ukraine and 
other EECCA countries suffer from some key problems: 
- Excessively high consumption of water per capita;  
- Deteriorating infrastructure which is inadequately maintained; 
- insufficient finance devoted to the sector. 
 
The coverage of water supply systems are relatively high; the rate of connection to sewerage is lower, but the 
greater problem is the deterioration of wastewater treatment plants.  
 
 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
28/07/2010  Page 5 of 24  
  
 
Source: ECE  Table 2.1 www.unece.org/env/documents/2003/inf/inf.14.e.pdf  
 
Consumption levels per capita are still relatively high in the region- average per capita consumption in 
Russia cities remained at around 300 litres per day in 2001 - which means that unnecessarily large volumes 
of water are being processed into the water supply systems. In Ukraine, water consumption fell during the 
1990s as a result of collapse of industrial consumption together with the impact of some metering of 
households and cuts in hot water services.   
 
The deterioration in water and wastewater networks is a result of a backlog of investment in maintenance and 
repair, and as a result there are problems with leakage, reliability and continuity of service.  Again, these 
should not be regarded as peculiar to these countries: the leakage rate in English water companies, for 
example, is 23% on average, and 33% in the area covered by Thames Water, the leading multinational from 
that country. 
 
1.4. Financial issues and the advantages of public sector borrowing 
The World Bank blames the financial problems on cuts in government subsidies: “After 1991, many 
countries cut sharply central government subsidies. With the shortfall in finances, the maintenance of 
existing infrastructure deteriorated drastically, albeit to a varying extent in different countries”. 6  The Bank‟s 
proposed solution – supported by OECD, UNECE and the MNCs - is not to restore subsidies but to increase 
charges to users, preferably to the point of “full cost recovery”, when users pay enough to cover the costs of 
operating the system and the costs of the infrastructure itself.  The UNECE report however is aware that this 
creates social problems: “this is already generating and will continue to generate serious social problems. 
There is evidence that a large portion of the population already pays a significant share of revenues for water 
services. If water tariffs increase to recover a greater share of utility costs, the number of those who have 
difficulty in paying their water bills is likely to increase dramatically. In the case of Khmelnitsky in the 
Ukraine, a 50% increase in water tariffs would result in more than 40% of households having to spend more 
than 4% of their total expenses on water” , and so UNECE advocates the use of a different kind of subsidy, 
in the form of welfare benefits for the poor. 
 
The key policy questions are how to assess which repairs and improvements are needed, then determine the 
level of investment needed; what is the best way of raising this finance; how the cost of that finance should 
be paid for; and how to provide the resources needed to operate and maintain the system. The IFIs and 
MNCs approach is to encourage the private sector to make equity investments, supported by loans from the 
IFIs and guarantees from governments, and for users to be charged the full costs of this finance.  
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However, the approach still used by the great majority of countries – including most developed countries – is 
to use public finance to raise the money for investment. This is done by municipalities borrowing from 
banks, or issuing bonds - or central governments may do this on behalf of municipalities, as is done in the 
USA for example. These public authorities have the advantage of being able to borrow money more cheaply 
than private companies, as the IMF has recently reminded everyone: “private sector borrowing generally 
costs more than government borrowing.”7  The costs of public borrowing are then covered partly by charges 
to users – structured to provide cross-subsidies from large to small consumers - and partly by taxation, which 
provides subsidies to prevent the general level of charges from being too high.  
 
The cost advantage of public sector borrowing highlights another disadvantage of using the private sector in 
some form of public-private partnership (PPP). The IMF again points out that “when PPPs result in private 
borrowing being substituted for government borrowing, financing costs will in most cases rise ...” and this 
means that PPPs have to be justified by greater operating efficiency of the private sector, in order to offset 
the borrowing costs. One consequence of this is that workers jobs, pay and conditions are more likely ot be 
reduced under private sector management. 
 
However, despite widespread assertion of the superiority of private companies, neither theory nor empirical 
evidence support a general assumption of superior private sector efficiency, as the IMF, once again, points 
out: “ While there is an extensive literature on this subject, the theory is ambiguous and the empirical 
evidence is mixed.” 8  In a sector like water, monopoly is common and competition is weak, so there is little 
theoretical reason to expect privatisation to be more efficient. And a review of the empirical evidence by 
Finnish economist Johann Willner shows that public ownership is at least as efficient in more than half of the 
studies, and Willner even concludes that political intervention may produce better results in oligopolistic 
markets, even if it creates „over-manning‟.9  
 
For these reasons public sector borrowing is an important way of delivering investment in infrastructure like 
water. Again, this was recognised by the IMF in March 2004, when it acknowledged that its own rules 
constraining public borrowing may have caused governments to under-invest in vital services: as a result,  
the IMF decide to relax its own restrictions on public sector borrowing for this purpose. 
10
 
 
1.5. Legal developments 
 
In Russia, the federal law on local government stipulates that the organisation, maintenance, and 
development of municipal water supply and sanitation are responsibilities of local governments, although  
the central government retains ownership of a few systems (including Moscow and St. Petersburg).11  Tariffs 
can be set by municipalities, and rose from 2000 because of economic growth, but there remains a chronic 
problem of unpaid bills.  
 
Since 1991, the previously state-owned utilities in Ukraine have been decentralised and transferred to 
municipalities, and the  central government has ended subsidies to these utilities: by 2002, municipalities 
owned 61 utilities, while 4 remained owned and run by central government . Municipalities now set utility 
tariffs, in accordance with rules defining which costs can be covered and so on.  Harmonisation with EU  
standards has significantly affected the reform process in the housing and utility sector. Municipalities  are 
able to transform water and sewerage departments of city councils into autonomous commercially-oriented 
business entities, and also provides the possibility of concessions and leases.12 
 
1.6. Case studies and experiences 
 
1.6.1. Russia: rapid and risky privatisations 
Since 2003 there has been rapid growth in the introduction of private companies to take over the 
management and operations of water systems.  By mid-2004 private Russian operators controlled about 50 
large utilities and many other municipalities were negotiating with one private financial group or another.   
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Operators do not usually become the owner of the assets, but take over under a lease, rent or concession 
arrangement running for 25-49 years.  These contracts are not subject to competitive tendering or review by 
a federal or regional property committee - municipalities can simply announce their intention to hire an 
operator; there is no requirement for financial disclosure; and investment obligations are rarely clearly 
spelled out.  There is a high risk of bankruptcy and exit by the private operator, especially as many of the 
companies have little or no experience in running water utilities, and in that case the liabilities will all fall on 
the municipality and/or central government. There are also dangers from the probability that private 
operators will use disconnection more freely as a method of gathering bills. 
 
Early attempts by municipalities to privatise water supply have involved local companies being given 
contracts which are unclear and unregulated . In the city of Syzran, for example, in 2001 a 5-year contract 
was signed with a new private water company founded by local businesses that were major consumers of 
water supply and sewerage service. The contract does not set any targets or any rules for tariff revisions.  
Similar problems were observed in Otradny, Nefteyugansk, and Perm. 13  
 
1.6.2. Russia: St Petersburg twinning 
 
In July 1997, the EBRD decided to issue a DM 127m (ECU 65m), 10-year loan to the municipally-owned 
water company St. Petersburg Vodokanal to help finance a DM 300m investment programme to overhaul the 
city‟s water supply and sanitation system. This was the first loan provided ever by a multilateral financial 
institution to a municipal utility on a non-sovereign basis, without any backing from a state or commercial 
bank guarantee. The loan was instead guaranteed by the city council as well as being “backed up by a 
separate project support undertaking from the Russian Government”.  The EBRD decided to issue the loan 
on this basis in the light of the company‟s operational performance and sound management, as well as the 
city council‟s international financial standing.  
 
St Petersburg also has a cooperation project with Stockholm Vatten, the Swedish municipally-owned water 
company, together with the municipally-owned Helsinki Water Company and the UK privatised water 
company Severn Trent, which started in 1998.  Stockholm was responsible for developing a strategy and a 
plan for the implementation of two projects relating to IT development and water use, and later for the 
implementation  of the plans and the drafting of a wastewater strategy and a wastewater plan.  Trade 
unionists from Finland and the UK have also been involved in the project. 14  
 
 
 
1.6.3. Ukraine: World Bank project in Lviv 
In March 2003 the Ukrainian parliament finally ratified a World Bank loan for financing the renovation of 
water and sewage systems of Lviv, a city with a population of 800,000, of which 63% werer receiving water 
for six or less hours a day during the 1990s. 15 The project is aimed at the rehabilitation of pumping stations, 
the replacement of around 20km of pipelines, financing the purchase of repair and construction equipment to 
make immediate improvements to the water network, and institutional strengthening of Lviv Vodokanal 
through the introduction of modern management principles, new water tariff structures and cost-saving 
measures.16 In addition to the $24m World Bank loan, financing will come from the local government 
($10m) and a grant from the Swedish International Development Agency ($6m). 17 
 
The World Bank tried very hard to use this loan to force the city to privatise water, despite its own agreement 
that “LVK is one of Ukraine's better managed and more receptive water and wastewater companies. It has 
had substantial experience over a period of four years in working with USAID and other bilateral agencies to 
start making operational improvements through interventions needing little capital expenditure. As a result, 
LVK has been able to successfully internalize and adopt changes in management operating practices that 
have led to significant improvements.”  
 
As a result of the Bank‟s political objectives, the loan was delayed by wrangling over the conditions.18  The 
municipality strongly rejected the World Bank‟s attempt to make privatisation a condition of the loan;  
objected to the nearly $9m of expenses for consultants and accompanying work, as well as to the obligatory 
loan condition of purchasing only foreign equipment; and considered that the interest rate initially proposed 
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by the bank was too high. During this process, in September 2002, Lviv Vodokanal director Vasyl Sklyarsky 
said he was inclined to obtain the loan from Ukrainian commercial banks.19  
 
The $24m 20-year loan is still conditional on the municipality tendering certain contracts.20  The project 
involves a MOIA (Management and Operations Improvement Advisor) contract with “an experienced 
international utility operator”. The World Bank notes that “the project promotes private sector activity as the 
proposed contract with the MOIA may be the first step of a deeper private sector engagement in the sector in 
the future…and could also ease a possible later transition into a lease or concession type of arrangement 
when the environment becomes more conducive to acceptance of this type of PSP.” Initially, it had planned 
to introduce a management contract with a foreign utility operator. 21 
 
This process of resisting the World Bank‟s proposals and ultimately negotiating a better and less restrictive 
deal has worked elsewhere in the world, for example the city of Recife, in Brazil, where the city also refused 
to accept privatisation as a condition and the World Bank backed down and offered a loan without that 
condition.  
 
1.6.4. Ukraine: EBRD and Zaporizhzhia 
In May 1999 the EBRD agreed to extend a €28m loan to the municipal Zaporizhzhia Vodokanal. The city of 
Zaporizhzhia was selected by the EBRD on the basis of its openness to reforms and its constructive approach 
to the financing and provision of municipal infrastructure and services. 22  The municipality of Zaporizhzhia 
and the national government of Ukraine guaranteed the loan.  
 
The project will help reduce the level of pollution in the Dnieper river as well as improve the efficiency and 
quality of water and waste-water services in Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine's sixth-largest city with a population of 
900,000 inhabitants. Igor Mityukov, Ukraine‟s Minister of Finance, said that the new cost-recovery-based 
tariff-setting system could be a model for the rest of the country. The project also includes a Corporate 
Partnership Programme involving western operators to enhance the financial and operational performance of 
Vodokanal. An explicit aim of the project is to introduce private sector participation in the municipal sector 
through a turnkey contract, involving the extension and operation of the company's largest waste-water 
treatment plant. The €20.9m contract was given to WTE Wassertechnik, which is now a subsidiary of the 
Austrian utility EVN: previously, and at the time of the original contract, it was owned by Berlinwasser.23  
 
1.6.5. Ukraine: campaign against EBRD privatisation in Odessa 
In Odessa  the water company needed money for investments – the system was losing water through leakage 
of between 45-60%.  Negotiations started with the EBRD for a loan of $64 million dollars. The EBRD then 
proposed a much larger loan - $200 million dollars to the water company, but under the condition that they 
give a concession to the multinational company Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux.  For two years negotiations 
between Suez and the mayor took place in secret, including visists to Paris, but no information was given to 
the water company itself or to local community groups. 
 
A women‟s group, active in promoting improvements to the water system, MAMA-86, asked repeatedly for 
information about the conditions of the proposed loan,  asked for a transparent process, public participation, 
an open tender, and finally organised a public meeting and told the media that the process must be made 
transparent or abandoned. In the end, partly as a result of this pressure, the negotiations were broken off and 
Suez abandoned Odessa.  
 
MAMA-86 has since been involved in constructing a different form of public, participative planning with the 
municipal water company in Soledar (Artemivsk administrative unit) based on local water resource 
management. 24   25 
 
1.7. Comments and policy issues 
 
There are some clear policy lessons to be drawn from the experiences so far in Russia and Ukraine, both 
negative and positive.   
 
PSIRU University of Greenwich                                                                                                                        www.psiru.org 
28/07/2010  Page 9 of 24  
  
The negative lessons include: 
 
There are real dangers involved in privatisation, especially with the current „wild‟ privatisations happening in 
Russia. There are real dangers of social and financial problems arising, which would create pressures on 
companies to cut jobs, pay and conditions as one way of solving their problems, and/or imposing unbearable 
price increases, or leaving the public authorities with debts and failures.  
 
A further danger is the extent of the network of the multinational water companies. Despite their apparent 
lack of interest so far, they are closely connected with the international institutions – including the World 
Bank, the EBRD, and the EU; with the apparently autonomous Russian oligarchs; and able, when they want, 
to make direct appeal to mayors, as they did in Odessa. Their power to affect policy in their own interests has 
been demonstrated in many countries and should not be underestimated. 
 
A third danger is the use of conditions attached to bank loans to lever privatisation. This is apparent from the 
cases described above – attempts were made in both Lviv and Odessa – and from experience elsewhere in 
the world. 
 
The positive lessons include: 
 
It is possible for municipally owned vodokanals to obtain loans directly from international institutions, 
without private partners, as shown by the cases of Lviv, Odessa and St. Petersburg.  The case of St 
.Petersburg also shows that such loans can be reinforced by support from public sector water companies from 
Europe, such as Stockholm Vatten and Helsinki Water, which can provide expertise without demanding 
profit.  
 
Privatisation is not necessarily the cheapest way of raising finance, and it may even be cheaper to avoid 
using the development banks if they insist on conditionalities, as was demonstrated in the case of Lviv. 
 
Finally, the power of civil society groups is apparent from the effectiveness of the campaigns, especially in 
Odessa.  This confirms the global experience, which is that not only unions but also consumer groups, 
women‟s groups and community associations have strongly and successfully resisted privatisation. 26  
 
2. International institutions 
A number of international agencies are engaged in active initiatives concerning water in Russia and NIS. The 
most active bodies are the OECD and the World Bank. There are financial initiatives from the International 
Institutions, the EBRD, and the EU – through the EU water initiative, EUWI.  There is also activity by UN 
agencies including UNECE, UNEP, and UNDP.  These initiatives take the form of conferences, task forces 
of officials, publications and projects. 
 
Most of the efforts of the international agencies are concentrated on promoting the introduction of the private 
sector. For the 2004 Moscow conference a major „Market development study‟ was prepared by the OECD, 
and the World Bank, and the World Bank-Netherlands Water Partnership, which surveyed the wishes of 
private companies – but not of municipalities – for the future development of the sector. 27  The study 
recommended „key reforms‟ including: a national committee and clearinghouse for PPP [public-private 
partnerships]; informational campaign/ PPP demonstration projects [i.e. propaganda]; and legislative 
reforms.  It is worth noting that this study, and all these reforms, are to be financed entirely through public 
funds using taxes paid in donor countries, not by private investors. 
 
The IFIs have a distinctive role in this market development. This includes providing finance for projects 
which attach conditions requiring the use of private companies; financing of changes to the laws and 
regulations on the water sector to make it easier for private companies, from any country, to participate; and 
preparing standard contracts and reducing transaction costs.  The IFIs and donors nevertheless offer 
themselves as „Neutral advisor to municipalities/utilities in PSP conception and in negotiations with PS 
[private sector]‟.28  
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2.1. OECD 
The OECD have organised a series of conferences and meetings on water in Russia and NIS. This began in 
October 2000, with a conference in Almaty (Kazakhstan) of NIS Ministers of Finance and Environment, 
which agreed a set of “Guiding Principles for Reform of the Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Sector in 
the NIS”.29 Since then there has been a series of conferences of environment ministers in the region (most 
recently in Tblisi, Georgia, in October 2004);  ; and conferences of financing environmental and water 
projects (most recently in Istanbul in January 2004); 30 and a conference jointly organised with the World 
Bank in Moscow in September 2004 (see below). 31  
 
The OECD runs official task forces for water in the region – the Task Force for the Implementation of the 
Environmental Action Programme, set up in 1993 (EAP); 32 and a Group of  Senior Officials on Urban Water 
Sector Reform in the NIS, set up in 2000 following the Almaty conference (meeting most recently in Paris in 
February 2004).33   
 
OECD publications mostly advance the orthodoxy of water privatisation, for example through a general 
briefing on PPPs in water, 34 and in a booklet and briefing on financing strategies. 35 The EAP and Group of 
Senior Officials have prepared joint reports on developments in the water sector since 1993;36 on progress 
with their general programme in the region since 2000;37 on utilities performance indicators in the region38 
and on social issues and consumer protection in water reform. 
2.2. European Bank for Reconstruction and  Development 
The EBRD has promoted water privatisation in various ways. In the mid-1990s, it provided loans which 
were tied to specific multinational companies (one tied to Suez, one tied to Veolia), so that any country could 
draw on the fund as long as it issued a contract to the named multinational. In 2003, it bought a 25% stake in 
private water operations in Bulgaria, Estonia and Poland which might have collapsed without the EBRD‟s 
intervention as „privatiser‟ of last resort.39  The EBRD has also provided loan finance to a number of 
municipal water operators without privatisation as a conditionality (indeed in a number of cases without 
requiring sovereign guarantees).  
 
The EBRD annual report on transition in 2004 focused on infrastructure, and indicates that the EBRD 
remains an unreconstructed believer that privatisation is good in its own right.40  
 
The EBRD runs the Project Preparation Committee (PPC), a network to coordinate international financial 
institutions and donors active in the region, established in 1993. 41 Its report to the 2003 Kiev conference lists 
projects financed by all PPC members.42 St Petersburg is the major example of a PPC coordinated project, 
involving $71million loan from EBRD, $32million finance from donors, and $68million from user charges 
raised by the St Petersburg Vodokanal itself. 43 The PPC membership includes international banks and 
institutions, and also European donor countries, and Canada, Japan and the USA. Neither Russia nor any of 
the NIS countries are members of the PPC.44   
 
2.3. World Bank 
The World Bank is also active in the region in this sector. It has sponsored conferences with the OECD, most 
recently in Moscow in September 2004, under the title of “Private solutions for the emerging water crisis in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia ?” ,45 and the previous year in Vienna, July 2003, under the title of “Private 
Sector Participation in Municipal Water Services in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia . 46   Its 
stated strategy for the region includes “Promote public-private partnerships to improve delivery of 
services….. PSP Based Urban Water Supply and Sanitation”,47 and the  opening presentation at the Vienna 
2003 conference, from Jamal Saghir, head of water and energy  infrastructure at the World Bank, identified 
the main questions as almost entirely concerned with increasing privatisation: “What we can do to make the 
environment more attractive [to private companies]? ….. Specific attention to:  How to get new entrants into 
the sector?  How to get the local private sector involved?”48   
 
Other semi-autonomous parts of the World Bank are also active in the region. For example, the Public 
Private Infrastucture Advisory Facility (PPIAF), a propaganda unit based in the World Bank which is partly 
funded by the Bank and partly by international aid programmes from individual countries, has run a project 
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in Azerbaijan to “prepare an appropriate strategy for private sector provision of water and waste water 
services in the Greater Baku metropolitan area”, a project in Georgia to find ways of using the private sector 
in water and wastewater in Georgia, projects in Kazakhstan to develop private sector solutions to water 
issues and to prepare a model contract “to showcase the benefits of involving the private sector in managing, 
operating, and maintaining the water supply systems in medium-size cities”, designed a contract for water 
privatisation in Uzbekistan, and a system for tendering and monitoring privatised water in Tajikistan.49  
2.4. International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
Part of the World Bank group, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) invests in private sector 
enterprises only. It is thus by definition a promoter of privatisation in all sectors: in recent years it has taken 
an increased proportion of  all World Bank funds, and has become more active in infrastructure and 
municipal services. The IFC made a presentation to the 2004 OECD/World Bank conference on how it could 
facilitate privatisation in utilities in the region.50 It has invested in bottling operations in the region for both 
Coca-cola (Baku, Azerbaijan) and Pepsi-Cola (Samara and Yekaterinberg).  
 
2.5. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
The UNECE runs the series of „Environment for Europe‟ conferences, starting in 1991, which created the 
EAP task force: the most recent conference was at Kiev in 2003, where the EU water initiative (see below) 
was the main item.51 
2.6. EU 
The EU has taken an active interest in the sector, mainly through the EU Water Initiative (EUWI) and their 
EU Water Facility, which is a fund of aid money from EU countries allocated to water, and targeted 
specifically at Africa, Asia and Russia and NIS.  The EUWI is based on the principle of using public funding 
to encourage private sector involvement: “The idea is to use donor money to create the conditions 
(governance, capacity) that will allow private finance to be attracted to the sector.” 52 
 
3. Companies 
3.1. International water companies 
The major OECD-based water multinationals (MNCs) are not at present seeking to obtain concessions or 
long-term leases or management contracts to operate water or wastewater in Russia or Ukraine. There are 
three reasons for this. First, the MNCs have performed poorly and failed to make reliable profits in many 
countries in recent years, and so they are in general contracting their operations and avoiding contracts where 
the risks are unclear.  Second, the companies have encountered hostility and opposition to privatisation of 
water services in almost all parts of the world, and so are reluctant to expand if there is risk of encountering 
further political opposition. Third, the legal and policy conditions in Russia do not make it easy for foreign 
companies to operate in the water sector (although the legal framework in Ukraine presents no obstacles).  
 
None of the MNCs have major contracts in Russia and none of them state that expansion into Russia or 
Ukraine is a priority. The MNCs activities in Russia and Ukraine are restricted to types of contract 
considered less risky, such as engineering build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts, and various forms of 
consultancy, including in partnership with Russian companies which have started to take over water 
operations.   
3.1.1. Suez 
Suez www.suez.com  (formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux) is the largest of the major multinational water 
companies.  Apart from water, it has a waste management division (Sita) and an energy division (Tractebel) 
both of which are also internationally active.  Suez used to be active in telecoms and media, but has now sold 
all its interests in those sectors. Suez operates in water services under the name of Ondeo, and in water 
engineering and construction under the name of Degremont.  Suez has one BOT construction project in 
Russia, and the company failed in an attempt to get a water concession in Odessa, Ukraine.  
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 In 2004 Degremont was given a sub-contract for the construction of an ultrafiltration unit for a 
drinking water production plant in South-West Moscow, which is being constructed by WTE 
Wassertechnik, a subsidiary of the Austrian EVN group, under a BOT concession.53 
 In 2002 Suez was actively negotiating with Odessa municipality (Ukraine) to obtain a 
concession, after the EBRD told the city that a loan for investment would be conditional on 
introducing a private company. There was strong local opposition, and Suez pulled out of 
negotiations at the end of 2002. 54    
 
3.1.2. Veolia 
Veolia www.veolia.com is a French-owned multinational, which operates internationally in waste, water,  
management, heating, and public transport.  Its global water operations of are about the same size as Suez. It 
was previously part of  Vivendi, - which was itself previously known as Generale des Eaux - which ran into 
serious  problems after an expansion into movies and music that almost destroyed the company.  The 
environmental services elements of Vivendi were broken off and recreated as Veolia. Veolia has a 
longstanding interest in water in Russia but only one specific contract has been reported – this is not to run 
municipal water services, but a BOT construction project.   It has not obtained any business in Ukraine. 
 
 In 2004 the St. Petersburg Vodokanal awarded Veolia a contract to build a sludge treatment plant for 
the North St. Petersburg wastewater treatment plant. The facility will have three incinerators, 
including flue gas treatment that complies with European standards and a co-generation system.  
Veolia will be paid €52 million for its contribution, out of a total amount of €70 million for the entire 
plant, which will be commissioned in 2006.
55
  It is not clear if this is a delayed implementation of a 
contract reported in 1993 by Veolia (then known as Generale des Eaux) : “A contract for 
FF108m [=approximately €17m] with French financing has just been agreed with St Petersburg 
for the construction of a sludge incineration oven for the principal waste water treatment 
plant.”56 
 
Veolia is also active in Kazakhstan, where it has a 30-year concession  to operate the water supply services 
in the capital city Almaty (1.2 million inhabitants), with drinking water and water treatment services for a 
30-year period, and hopes to earn around €850m. in return. 
 
3.1.3. SAUR 
SAUR is the third French water company, part of the large French construction group Bouygues. It has been 
broken up by a series of partial sales, so that its former UK operations are now owned by an Australian 
finance company, Macquarie; Its former operations in Africa and Italy are still owned by Bouygues; but its 
operations in France, Poland  (where it operates Gdansk‟s water services) and Russia are now owned by a 
French financial company PAI. 
  
 Since 1994 Saur has had a joint venture with Moscow's Mosvodokanal, Rossa, which is 51% 
owned by Saur and 49% owned by Mosvodokanal, and runs a laboratory that analyses water 
both for public services and industrialists in Moscow and other Russian cities.57 
3.1.4. Severn Trent 
Severn Trent is one of the private UK water companies created by the Thatcher government in 1989. It has a 
profitable regional monopoly in the UK, but it has not been very successful in expanding its privatisations of 
international water supply activities, and has only a few management or consultancy contracts outside the 
UK. It has held two consultancy contracts in Russia. 
 Severn Trent was employed in 2000 on a British Government funded project to introduce an  
environmental management system for St Petersburg Vodokanal.58 
 Severn Trent is advising on a strategy to improve the water network in Perm City, northern 
Siberia, a city of 1 million people. Perm City‟s water system was privatised in July 2003 via a 
49-year lease to Novogor, a subsidiary of the Russian conglomerate Interros, this being the first 
water privatisation in Russia. 
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3.1.5. Acea 
Acea is an Italian water company partly owned by the municipality of Rome, where it holds the water supply 
monopoly.  
 Acea was selected to manage the water board in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, which has over 
1 million inhabitants.  
 
3.1.6. EVN (WTE Wassertechnik) 
WTE Wassertechnik was previously owned by the German company Berlinwassser, but was sold to the 
Austrian utility EVN in October 2003. EVN is one of five Austrian energy and water utilities, which remain 
controlled by the public sector: the provincial government of Lower Austria is the majority shareholder with 
51% of shares. In addition, EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG owns more than 10%: EnBW itself is 
34.5% owned by EdF, (the French electricity company which is 100% owned by the French state) and 
another 34.5% owned by the Austrian utility OEW.  
 
EVN is not one of the big private water multinationals but is actively expanding in both water and energy in 
eastern and southeast Europe. 
 
WTE designs, builds, finances and operates municipal and industrial water and wastewater plants. It operates 
69 sewage plants for some 8.5 million people and has operations in both Austria and ten other EU and CEE 
countries. WTE has won a series of BOT contracts in Moscow since 1996.  These include:  
 South Butowo, Moscow : BOOT contract for the design, finance, construction and operation of 
the waste treatment plant; started in 1997, in operation since December 1998 till the year 2011.  
 Zelenograd, Moscow: waste water treatment plant , began the construction in 1998 and started 
operation in December 2000 to 2013..  
 Ljuberzy, Moscow region: waste water treatment plant, started in 1997 and commissioned in 
2000.  
 South West Moscow: new water supply plant for 1 million inhabitants; under construction, WTE 
will start operation in 2007 for a 10-year-period. 
 
The financing of these BOT projects is based on a complex web of guarantees from various governments, 
municipalities and other public authorities. 
 
3.2. Russian water companies 
3.2.1. Russian Communal Systems (RKS)    
Russian Communal Systems (RKS) is the biggest and best known private provider of communal services in 
Russia.  RKS was created on 29 May 2003 by Gazprom and RAO UES, the two greatest Russian utility 
monopolies. RKS‟s current budget is 14 billion rubles and expected to reach one billion dollars in 2005.59 
ZAO PriceWaterhouseCoopers Audit is one of its auditors.60 
 
Gazprom (via its subsidiary Gazprombank) and RAO UES each own 25 % of RKS. Other founders include 
Interros – 10%, Kuzbassrazrezugol – 10%, Renova – 10%, EvrazHolding - 10%, and Evrofinans - 10%. 
Gazprombank is reported to have sold its stock to an undiscolosed buyer.61 Some reports about possible 
changes in the list of shareholders appeared at the end of 2004. RAO UES is expected to increase its stake in 
this company.62   
 
RKS has 26 subsidiaries, and has signed contacts with 37 Russian public authorities in 16 Russian regions. 
Total number of current contracts is 52,63 including 6 contracts in water supply and sanitation.64 RKS has 
lease contracts with public authorities of Blagoveshchensk (Amur Communal Systems), Volgograd 
(Volgograd Communal Systems), Kirov (Kirov Communal Systems), Kachkanar (Sverdlovsk Communal 
Systems), Tambov (Tambov Communal Systems), and Tomsk (Tomsk Communal Systems).  The lease 
contract with Volgograd City covers water supply and sanitation for 780,000 subscribers for the period from 
25 February 2004 to 25 January 2005. In August 2004, RKS signed a partnership agreement with the 
Mayor‟s Office of Rostov-on-Don regarding water supply and the improvement of city‟s water and 
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sanitation systems.65 A subsidiary of RKS started to operate in St. Petersburg.66  RKS has also a contract with 
Lukoil, a major Russian oil company. 
 
In order to finance its projects Russian Communal Systems is negotiating investments with a number of 
banks. According to RKS CEO Sergey Yashechkin, the company has almost secured contracts with a dozen  
banks. Also, RKS intends to take a three-year loan from its major shareholder RAO UES with annual interest 
rate of 6 percent.
67
 In turn, the head office of the company invests in RKS subsidiaries. For example, at the 
end of September 2003, RKS allocated a 30.38 million ruble soft credit to JSC Arkhangelsk Communal 
Systems for purchasing essential equipment.68  
 
RKS has shown its interest in cooperation with foreign investors and partners. On 29 April 2004 managers of 
RKS met representatives of Severn Trent Water International Ltd, Veolia Environment, SUEZ, SIDA, 
EnPrima, ЕБРР, and МБРР. Suez along with other major foreign public companies is seen as a possible 
investor. 
 
On 24 September 2004, RKS announced that the first phase of its development was successfully ended. The 
company had introduced the schemes of investments in the public sector and explored the possibilities and 
problems of the market of public services. From now on RKS decided to focus on regions with good 
economic-political situations in which RKS business projects could be most efficient: in particular, it intends 
to focus on regions of Altay and Amur as well as on the large Russian cities of Archangel, Vladimir, 
Volgograd, Voronezh, Tambov, Kirov, Saratov, Ekaternburg, Smolensk, Tver, and Tomsk. The management 
intends to apply a more strict investment policy, although investments in regions would remain between 
$500-700 million. During the second phase, the company aims to become profitable (or at least to not have 
losses). For this purpose, RKS plans to restructure its management and dismiss a number of employees.69   
 
RKS has nearly 6,500 employees.70 The head of RAO UES has said that Russian Utilities Systems annually 
lose 117 billion rubles71because RKS has encountered the common problem of unpaid debts to Russian 
communal services: for instance, the debt of consumers to RKS for heating amounts to 860 million rubles 
(1.09.2004). Because of that RKS, on the grounds of current legislation, terminated delivery of energy to 
debtors. RKS management revealed, however, that the company is ready to restart delivery of energy to the 
firms which express their wishes to repay their debts provided their assurances are legally and financially 
supported.72 
3.2.2. Russian Communal Investments (RKI) 
Russian Communal Investments (RKI) is a subsidiary of Bazoviy Element, which is a major Russian 
company controlled by Deripaska, one of most powerful Russian oligarchs. It was registered in February 
2004 and Evrosibenergo (the company managing assets of Russkiy Alluminiy, another of Deripaska‟s major 
companies) was expected to support and coordinate RKI projects.73 Although there are some doubts about 
the profitability of these projects, some observers noted that Deripaska‟s initiative to invest in the public 
sector yielded him some political and economic benefit, such as the post of Russia‟s representative in 
ASEAN.74  
 
RKI‟s priorities are the regions in which Bazoviy Element has its major assets. RKI establishes subsidiaries 
in those regions after signing contracts with municipal authorities. The list of preliminary agreements with 
municipal authorities has included six regions.75 In contrast to RKS which started its development from the 
West, RKI began its expansion from the East and is reported to have secured contracts with several 
important regions in Siberia. It is still unknown whether RKI is ready to provide large-scale investments in 
these regions.76 RKI focuses on service providers in Nizhniy Novgorod oblast, Krasnodarsky Kray 
(including Sochi Tuapse, Anapa, Gelendgic) Krasnoyarsky Kray, Buriatia, Kaliningrad Oblast and cities 
Barnaul, Eisk and Novosibirsk.77 Within these regions RKI intended to select local objects which it considers 
appropriate for its service.  
 
RKI has said that it did not intend to compete with RKS and consequently would focus on regions which are 
not covered by RKS contracts. Spokesmen for RKI argued that the Russian market of communal services is 
huge and has enough room for both companies.78 In addition, they expressed the intention to negotiate and 
cooperate with RKS regarding contracts in shared regions, such as Archangelsk79 and Nizhniy Novgorod.80 
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In March 2004, Deripaska explained that his criteria for investment are based on the estimate of competitive 
advantages of a possible object and its market value as well as the potential for increasing services and the 
possibility of restructuring and integrating the object into other his companies. He said that non profitable 
companies can be worth investing in only if there is a chance to make them profitable in the near future.81  
RKI‟s commercial selection criteria can be illustrated by the example of Buriatia, the first region in which 
municipal authorities signed a preliminary agreement with RKI. It has been reported that after a week of 
calculations and inspection of various local providers, representatives of RKI decided that the Vodocanal 
was the only profitable municipal function in Buriatia. However, because Vodocanal was profitable without 
any investments, the public authorities rejected RKI‟s offer to take it; RKI did not find another investment 
opportunity, and so it left this region.82 
 
The company intends to invest around US $500 million during the next 5 years. It expects an average rate of 
return in their projects from 10% to 15%.83 RKI does not apparently have problems with the generally low 
level of profit in communal services, because it intends to take only profitable municipal enterprises with 
intention to make them even more profitable. The company plans to invest in the communal sector US$ 200 
million before 2010 and up to US$ 700 million before 2015. 84   
3.2.3. Rosvodokanal (Alfa Eco) 
The majority shareholder is Alpha-Eco.85  Alfa Eco constitutes important part of Alfa group which is 
controlled by another Russian oligarch Michael Fridman. This investment company supports a great variety 
of Fridman‟s business projects in banking, trade, oil, telecommunications and manufacturing. 86  The former 
President of Alfa Eco, Gleb Fitisov, later took a seat on the Federation Council. Although he has denied any 
involvement in business since then, it emerged in August 2004 that he holds a minority stake of 
approximately USD 1 billion in Alfa Telecom, another major company of Alfa Group, which mainly belongs 
to CTF Holdings, an offshore company registered in the British Virgin Islands.87 
 
The public sector attracted the attention of Alfa Eco managers in 2003 and the company primarily focuses on 
regions in which Alfa Group‟s main enterprises (oil refineries and metal processing works) are located. It 
includes Orenburg Oblast, Voronezhskay Oblast and Kransnoyarsk Kray.88 Although Alfa Eco undertakes its 
major projects in regions of its parent company, it plans to expand into other regions. For example, Alfa Eco 
negotiated with municipal authorities in Pskov and participated in a bid for providing communal services in 
Nizhniy Novgorod.89  Its bid for Kostroma water utilities was declined by the local Duma.90 
  
One of Alfa Eco‟s first investment projects was Rosvodokanal, the oldest Russian municipal utility which 
supplies water for many regions of the Russian Federation for over 50 years. 91 It is a successor of 
Rosvodokanalnaladka Group established in 1949 with aim to provide water and sanitation services in 
Russia.92 It has branches in 10 Russian regions.93 It operates subsidiaries in Russian largest cities, including 
Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Ufa, Novosibirsk, Volgograd, Chelyabinsk, Rostov-on-Don, Tver, Moscow and 
St. Petersburg.94 Alfa Eco aimed to transform Rosvodokanal into an efficient private provider of communal 
services.95 In turn, Rosvodocanal helps Alfa Eco expand its investment projects in the public sector. For 
example, Rosvodokanal signed a contract with municipal authorities of Orenburg. Where, Rosvodokanal 
guarantees to invest annually up to 50 million rubles in a subsidiary which was established by Alfa Eco 
together with the Administration of Orenburg and the Congress of Municipal Utilities in Russia. After six 
months the mayor of Orenburg acknowledged an improvement of communal services which was partly 
based on a 20% decrease in the number of debtors.96 
 
It is reported that Rosvodokanal increased revenue to 16% and tariff payment from 85 to 97%. Water loss 
decreased from 27% to 21%.97 It is also stated that Rosvodokanal intends to invest at least 1 billion Russian 
roubles (RUR) per target city before 2010.98  
3.2.4. Novogor-Prikamye 
The sole owner of Novogor-Prikamye is New Urban Infrastructure ZAO which is a member of Interros 
holding, the major company controlled by one of the most powerful Russian oligarchs Vladimir Potanin.99 It 
should be noted that Interros also owns 10% of RKS.  
 
Novogor controls the housing sector in Norilsk, hires water utility Permvodokanal in Perm, and plans to 
expand in the Volga-Kama basin,100 in particular in Nizhniy Novgorod.101 Like some other Potanin‟s 
projects,102 Novogor is connected with British companies. For example, Novogor-Prikamye water plant, 
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which is regarded as the first privately owned water utility in Russia (with technology resembling the one 
used in Birmingham in 1973), is linked with the Severn Trent water company.103 Severn Trent Water advises 
Novogor on how to run privatised utilities.  It has also been reported that Interros would like to form a joint 
venture with Veolia in water supply, because the French company has a wide and successful experience in 
the sphere, but the obstacle is Russian legislation prohibiting giving information to foreigners about water 
supplies in cities with a population of over 300,000.104 
 
In July 2003, "Interros" purchased 100% of "Sovremenniy Gorod" which agreed a leasing contract with 
Perm municipal authorities to rent Permvodokanal for 49 years. Novogor-Prikamye is part of "Sovremenniy 
Gorod" and it manages assets of the housing sector of Perm, one of the largest industrial cities in Russia.105  
In 2003, LLC Novogor-Prikamye was expected to invest 100 million rubles in the renovation of 
Permvodokanal. However, Novogor‟s representatives claimed that they had problems with finding essential 
investment in order to improve the quality of water supplies because they could not raise consumers bills.106  
 
Novogor is also expanding into energy services. In August 2004, Novogor, the administration of the 
Leningrad Oblast, and LLC Avrora-Energo-Management, linked to Lenenergo, established Leningrad 
Regional Managing Power Transmission Company (LOESK) and appointed the Chairman of the regional 
energy commission Lev Khabachev as its General Director.107 The government of the Leningrad Oblast owns 
52 percent of this company while the other participants own 24 percent each. LOESK is expected to manage 
all 22 municipal energy utilities in the Leningrad oblast and to invest 700 million roubles in the development 
of energy infrastructure in 2005.108  
 
It plans to invest up to US$ 50 million.109 Novogor-Prikamye‟s net profit in the first quarter of 2004 was 
RUR 33,384 million.110  As far as its project in Perm is concerned, it invested RUR 64,070,000 in the 
infrastructure from Dec 2003 to January 2004. The company is reported to have saved 13,305,000 Russian 
Roubles in six months due to 1.8% decrease in leaks and break-downs.  
 
3.3. Relations between multinational water companies and Russian/Ukrainian companies 
Although the multinational companies have so far not sought or obtained operating contracts in Russia or 
Ukraine, they still have a clear interest in such a large market, and are engaging in two ways. Firstly, they are 
obtaining contracts to construct and operate treatment plants –Suez, Veolia and EVN are all doing this – 
which gives them a position in the market and some experience. Secondly, they are all holding discussions 
about possible partnership agreements with the main Russian companies e.g. RKS has spoken with Suez, 
Severn Trent and Veolia: Novogor-Prikamye is using Severn Trent as an advisor on the Perm contract.  
 
Longer term, the development of the market by Russian private companies could become a means of entry 
for the multinationals. This view was expressed by the introductory note for the OECD-World Bank 
conference in Moscow 2004: “The growing role of the domestic private sector in Russia …..could create 
new opportunities for international companies as well. Co-operative arrangements between domestic 
operators and international operators could help domestic companies to improve their business practices and 
…. also help international companies gain more experience of operating in the markets of this region”.111 
 
This also fits with the pattern elsewhere in the world. In Asia, for example, the development of local water 
companies in Malaysia and Hong Kong is largely in partnership with the multinationals, not in competition 
with them.  
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4. Annexe 1: projects 
4.1. EBRD: projects in environmental services, Russia and former Soviet Union countries. 
Country Year 
of 
signing 
Op Name  Project 
Value 
€m. 
 Loan 
€m. 
 Equity 
€m. 
 Total EBRD 
Finance €m. 
(company)  2003 International Water United Utilities  38,355  0  17,811  17,811 
 Azerbaijan  1995 Baku Water Rehabilitation  82,406  18,034  0  18,034 
Estonia  2002  Tallinn Water Privatisation Financing  172,800  55,000  0  55,000 
Estonia  1995  Small Municipalities Environment Project  46,025  10,226  0  10,226 
Estonia  1994  Tallinn Water and Environment Project  74,562  22,723  0  22,723 
Kazakhstan  2000 Almaty Solid Waste ManagementRehabilitation  19,524  15,874  0  15,874 
Latvia 2000 Riga Water Company Corporate Loan  133,855 35,581 0  35,581 
Latvia 1996 Riga Environment Project  74,635 13,163 0  13,163 
Lithuania  2003  City of Vilnius Municipal Infrastructure  8,540  7,000  0  7,000 
Lithuania  2001  Kaunas Water and Environment - Phase II  73,600  14,700  0  14,700 
Lithuania  1995  Kaunas Water and Environment  74,545  11,864  0  11,864 
Moldova  1997  Chisinau Water Services Rehabilitation  32,452  18,057  0  18,057 
Russian Federation 2003 St Petersburg South-West Waste WaterTreatment Plant 188,749  35,450  0  35,450 
Russian Federation 2003 Archangelsk Municipal Water ServicesDevelopment  24,694  9,394  0  9,394 
Russian Federation 2003 Treatment Plant Incinerator  49,400  23,800  0  23,800 
Russian Federation 2003 Yaroslavl Municipal Water Services Devt Programme 17,883 13,320 0 13,320 
Russian Federation 2002 Ostankino Tower Repairs 27,383 11,112 0 11,112 
Russian Federation 2002  St. Petersburg Flood Protection Barrier 465,986  194,460  0  194,460 
Russian Federation 2002  Surgut Municipal Services DevelopmentProgramme 71,650  36,652  0  36,652 
Russian Federation 2001  St Petersburg Toxic Waste Clean-Up Programme 8,151  4,365  0   
Russian Federation 1999 Kaliningrad Water and Environmental Services  48,178  14,287  0  14,287 
Russian Federation 1997 St. Petersburg Municipal Support  54,685 540,041   
Russian Federation 1997 St Petersburg Water & Env Services Improv. Program 44,611  8,692  0 8,692 
Ukraine 1999 Zaporizhzhia - Water Utility Development &Investment 
Programme 
 34,503  22,224  0  22,224 
Uzbekistan  2001 Andijan District Heating Improvement and Reform  24,859  11,906  0  11,906 
Uzbekistan 1998 Tashkent Solid Waste Management Rehabilitation 38,303 15,239 0  15,239 
 
 
4.2. World Bank projects in water and wastewater in Russia, Ukraine and NIS  
Note: All projects are IBRD/IDA or Global Environment Facility 
 
Country/Area   Approval 
Date   
Project Name  
  
Amount*
  
Status   
Privatisation related objectives in project 
documents 
Armenia N/A YEREVAN WATER AND 
WASTEWATER PROJECT 
20 Proposed  
Armenia 26-AUG-1997 Second Structural Adjustment Credit 60 Closed  
Armenia 11-JUN-1998 Municipal Development 30 Active  
Armenia 08-DEC-1994 IRRIGATION REHABILITATION 
PROJECT 
43 Closed  
Armenia 04-MAY-2004 Municipal Water and Wastewater 23 Active  
Azerbaijan 28-JUN-1995 Baku Water Supply 61 Active  
Azerbaijan 12-MAR-2002 SAC II (formerly PSRAC) 60 Closed  
Azerbaijan 10-DEC-2002 SUPPLEMENTAL BAKU WATER 
SUPPLY 
12.92 Active  
Azerbaijan 03-JUN-2004 RURAL INVESTMENT PROJECT 
(AZRIP) 
15 Active  
Georgia N/A Tbilisi Water Supply 15 Dropped  
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Country/Area   Approval 
Date   
Project Name  
  
Amount*
  
Status   
Privatisation related objectives in project 
documents 
Georgia 08-NOV-1994 Municipal Infrastructure Rehabilitation 18 Closed  
Kazakhstan N/A Northeastern Kazakhstan Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project 
23 Dropped  
Kazakhstan 23-DEC-
1996 
Pilot Water Supply Project 7 Closed  
Kazakhstan 08-JUN-
1999 
Atyrau Pilot Water Supply and 
Sanitation Project 
16.5 Closed  
Kyrgyz Republic 14-DEC-2004 SMALL TOWNS INFRASTRUCTURE & 
CAPACITY BUILDING PROJECT 
15 Active  
Kyrgyz Republic 04-DEC-2001 Rural Water and Sanitation Project 15 Active  
Moldova 20-MAY-2003 PILOT WATER SUPPLY AND 
SANITATION PROJECT 
12 Active  
Moldova 17-JUN-2004 Social Investment Fund II Project 20 Active  
Russian 
Federation 
21-DEC-2000 Municipal Water and Wastewater 122.5 Active “Full recovery of costs, including 
operations, adequate maintenance, 
depreciation, finance charges and 
opportunity cost on invested equity from 
user charges is essential to ensure the long 
term viability of the water utilities and 
recovery of their ability to provide an 
acceptable level of service […]. Initially, the 
most likely form of private sector 
involvement would be management type 
contracts with foreign or domestic partners 
that does not expose the operator to any 
large financial risk, but even these would be 
difficult to secure under present conditions. 
Therefore the project does not require any 
private sector involvement at this 
stage.”5 
Russian 
Federation 
08-NOV-1994 RUSSIA ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT PROJECT 
110 Active  
Tajikistan N/A Tajikistan Municipal Infrastructure 
Development Project 
15 Proposed  
Tajikistan 27-AUG-1998 EMERGENCY FLOOD ASSISTANCE 5 Closed  
Tajikistan 22-JUN-2000 RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
REHABILITATION PROJECT 
20 Active  
Tajikistan 18-JUN-2002 Dushanbe Water Supply Project 17 Active  
Tajikistan 15-JUN-2004 COMMUNITY AGRICULTURE AND 
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
PROJECT 
10.8 Active  
Tajikistan 14-DEC-1999 Emergency Flood Assistance Project - 
Supplemental Credit 
2 Closed  
Turkmenistan 27-MAY-1997 Water Supply and Sanitation 30.3 Closed  
Ukraine 05-JUN-2001 Lviv Water and Wastewater Project 24.25 Active  
Uzbekistan 21-AUG-1997 Rural Water Supply & Sanitation 75 Active  
Uzbekistan 19-MAR-2002 Bukhara and Samarkand Water Supply 
Project 
40 Active  
Uzbekistan 12-SEP-1996 Pilot Water Supply Engineering Project 5 Closed  
Some quotes from project documents from the World Bank website; some extracted from “Will the World 
Bank Back Down? Water Privatisation in a  climate of Global Protest”: Sara Grusky and Maj Fiil-Flynn. 
Public Citizen April 2004 http://www.citizen.org/documents/worldbank2004.pdf  
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4.3. PPIAF projects 
 
AZERBAIJAN:Private Sector Involvement in the Provision of Water and Wastewater Services in Greater Baku 
GEORGIA:Private Participation in Georgia's Water and Wastewater Sector 
KAZAKHSTAN:Private Sector Options in Water for Small and Medium Sized Cities. 
KAZAKHSTAN:Privatisation Strategy for Water Supply Systems in Northeastern Kazakhstan 
LITHUANIA:Private Sector Participation in Water and Wastewater Service Provisions 
TAJIKISTAN:Private Sector Participation in Water Supply  
UZBEKISTAN:Private Sector Participation in the Water Sector 
 
 
4.4. PPC projects 
http://www.ppcenvironment.org/projects_database.asp?Sort=Country 
Title Country Lead 
Komi Municipal Water Services - Syktyvkar RUSSIA EBRD 
St. Petersburg South-Western Wastewater Treatment Plant RUSSIA NIB 
Novgorod Cross Municipal Rehabilitation RUSSIA NIB 
Kaliningrad Solid Waste Management Project RUSSIA NIB 
Murmansk District Heating Project RUSSIA NIB 
Neva Direct Discharges Closure Programme RUSSIA NIB 
St. Petersburg District Heating Programme RUSSIA EBRD 
Ladoga Environmental Programme RUSSIA NIB 
Komi-Uhta Municipal Water Services Development Project RUSSIA EBRD 
Arkhangelsk Municipal Water Services Project RUSSIA EBRD 
St. Petersburg Northern WWTP Incinerator RUSSIA EBRD 
Kaliningrad District Heating Rehabilitation RUSSIA EBRD 
Khujand Water Supply Improvement Project TAJIKISTAN EBRD 
Tashkent Water Supply Improvement Project UZBEKISTAN EBRD 
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4.5. IFI Project Status 
    
ADB Technical assistance in urban water supply and sanitation (Azerbaijan)  Approved 2001  (740,000USD grant) 
 Rural water supply and sanitation in Northern Kazakhstan (includes 
several small towns up to 50,000) 
 Disbursement  ($35 million, 2000) 
 Communal water supply and sanitation project (Kyrgyz Republic)  Disbursement  ($36million, 2000) 
 Western Uzbekistan water supply project (Uzbekistan)  Approval expected 2002  (38M USD loan) 
 Urban water supply (Uzbekistan)  Approved 2001  (36M USD loan) 
EBRD Baku water rehabilitation (Azerbaijan)  Under implementation  (23.2M EUR loan) 
 Almaty potable water and sewerage (Kazakhstan)  Signed 2000 (7.5M EUR loan) 
 Chisinau water services rehabilitation (Moldova)  Under implementation (23.2M EUR loan) 
 St. Petersburg water and environmental servicesimprovement 
programme (Russian Federation) 
Under implementation (17.9M EUR loan) 
 Kaliningrad water and environmental services (RussianFederation) Under implementation (18.3M EUR loan) 
 Yaroslavl municipal water services development programme (Russian 
Federation) 
Board approved 2002  (16.3M EUR loan) 
 St. Petersburg southwest wastewater treatment plant (Russian 
Federation) 
 In development  (20M EUR loan) 
 Zaporizhzhia water utility development and investment programme 
(Ukraine) 
 Under implementation  (28.5M EUR loan) 
NEFCO Completion of southwest water treatment plant in St.Petersburg 
(Russian Federation) 
 Approved 2001  under negotiation 
 Municipal wastewater treatment in St. Petersburg (Russian Federation) Approved 2001  
 Municipal wastewater treatment: Kaliningrad waterservices 
rehabilitation (Russian Federation) 
 Approved 2001  
 Water treatment in Lovozero (Russian Federation)  Approved 2001  
 Water treatment in Murmansk, Murmanvodokanalstroy  Approved 2001  
 Municipal water, sewerage, energy, and waste project in Novgorod 
(Russian Federation) 
 Approved 2001 under negotiation 
World Bank Armenia: Yerevan Water Supply and Sanitation  Under implementation  (IDA $20 million) 
 Azerbaijan Baku Water Supply (supplementary loan)  Negotiations  ($10 million) 
 Georgia Tbilissi Water and Sanitation  Final negotiations  (IDA $20 million) 
 Kazakhstan Atyrau water  Under implementation  ($17 million) 
 Kazakhstan Northeast Kazakhstan water (Temirtau, Karaganda and 
Kokshetau) 
 Negotiations  ($80 million) 
 Kyrgyz Republic Rural water project (about 10% on municipal water)  Under implementation  (IDA $$12 million) 
 Moldova Pilot water and Sanitation  Final negotiations  (IDA $10 million) 
 Russian Federation water and sanitation project  Under implementation ($122.5 million) 
 Tajikistan Dushande water project  Under implementation  (IDA $17 million) 
 Turkmenistan Dashhovuz water  Under completion  
 Ukraine Lviv water and wastewater project  Approved $24.25 million 
 Uzbekistan Bukhara and Samarkand water supply  project Appraisal  $20 million 
    
 GEF   
    
 wastewater   
 related   
 Rostov Nutrient and Methane Discharges Reduction Grant  Under preparation  $10.8 
 Moldova Nutrient reduction Grant  Under preparation  $5 million 
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